How Effective was the “Pulwama Effect”?
The 2019 national elections result is an indication that Indian politics is fraught with contradictions, now more than ever. Despite agrarian distress and recent farmer protests, Bharatiya Janata Party’s (BJP) strongest showing was in the country’s rural constituencies. Despite the government’s lackluster economic record, the business community and the market rooted for BJP return. In spite of insufficient job creation, the first-time voters in India were on BJP’s side. In spite of the party’s unabashed boasting of a higher share of winning candidates from privileged upper castes than its rivals, the BJP succeeded in knitting together a rainbow coalition across the Hindu caste spectrum. This makes the political pundits and analysts wonder, if there was an external factor that acted as the counterbalancing element, this time.
The terror attack in Pulwama on 14th February, 2019; India's air strike in Balakot on 27th February, 2019 as a response to the tragedy; the capture of Wing Commander Abhinandan Varthaman and his eventual release—did make Pakistan and terrorism--- key issues in the run-up to the 2019 Lok Sabha elections.
It is known that elections have an impact on foreign and security policies. Who comes to power, with what agenda, does decide policies. However, it is difficult to make definitive statements about the reverse—the effect of national security on voting behavior. Some cite the BJP–led government’s “surgical strike” across the line of control in Kashmir in 2016 as benefiting the party in the 2017 state elections in Uttar Pradesh and Uttarakhand, but Congress still got Punjab. Further back, the 1971 after the India-Pakistan war Indira Gandhi led Congress did make gains in the state elections held in 1972, including in head-to-head contests with the BJP’s predecessor, and the war did significantly contribute to her image as a “strong” leader. But by the time the next elections were held in 1977, the Congress was defeated largely due to the anger against the Emergency. The October 1999 general election took place three months after the Kargil crisis. The BJP-led coalition returned to power, but the party did not gain additional seats and actually lost vote share. The 2009 general election took place less than five months after the 2008 Mumbai attack. The opposition criticized Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s Indian National Congress party led coalition government for not retaliating. Nonetheless, the coalition was reelected, with the Congress party winning additional sixty-one seats. Past security confrontations have had a rather mixed impact on elections. However, this poll took place just a few weeks after the India-Pakistan crisis, while the 1999 and 2009 elections were held a few months after the crises and by that time the effect might have dissipated. Yet, it is very difficult to separate the impact of national security from other factors objectively, in case of an election.
Whether or not the Pulwama attack is substantially responsible for Modi’s BJP winning a second term or not, the Indian Air Force (IAF) strike in Balakot after the Pulwama terrorist attack did help shift the campaign narrative and the energy around it. After the Congress had made gains in recent state elections, BJP was on the back foot. With the IAF strike, as well as an anti-satellite test, BJP argued that it had delivered on the international element of acche din (Good Days). The party cited both of these developments as demonstrations of strength and its leaders used them in two distinct ways in the campaign. On the one hand, they claimed that they have earned India respect on the world stage, and on the other, they suggested that Modi is the indispensable chowkidar or “guardian,” and that India’s security would be threatened without him. BJP hoped to counter the anti-incumbency factor and give voters who were unhappy with the party for nonperformance in other arenas, a convincing reason to vote in their favor. The party also thought that this would deflect the Congress party’s attacks on the BJP for not doing enough to build security capabilities to counter China. Unlike during the 2014 campaign, Modi had not targeted Beijing during the 2019 campaign and instead had sought to stabilize relations with China over the last year.
The national sentiment on security and terror-related issues in India peaked at nearly 29 % in early March after India retaliated with airstrikes on a suspected militant camp in Pakistan, according to CVoter polling agency. But, even before the incident at Pulwama, two surveys conducted by Pew Research Center in 2018 shed light on how voters in India see their elected officials and their democracy. One of the key findings from that survey was that Indians largely view Pakistan as a threat and believe the situation in Kashmir warrants more military force. In the Center’s last year spring survey, 76% of Indians said Pakistan is a major threat to their country, including 63% who said it is a very serious threat. This view was shared by people in rural areas and urban centers, supporters of both the prime minister’s BJP and the Congress party, as well as Indians across all age groups. Additionally, 65% said terrorism is a very big problem in India. When asked specifically about Kashmir, a majority of Indians (55%) saw the situation there as a very big problem. More than half (53%) said circumstances in Kashmir had gotten worse over the last five years, and 58% believed the Indian government should use more military force than it uses currently in dealing with tensions in the area. Kashmir is seen by Indians as an unresolved, festering wound, that needs a permanent solution, so that is ceases to be the most densely militarized zone in the World.
The general trend of foreign and national security policy in India, has tended to be fairly consistent. Leaders since Jawaharlal Nehru have emphasized that foreign policy needs to serve domestic objectives primarily, and while opposition parties have criticized many foreign policies, they often end up following the same when they occupy office. The BJP has tended to portray itself as more hawkish on foreign policy, and criticized the Congress for taking a softer approach toward China and Pakistan. But it too, has made peaceful propositions to both countries once in power.
So, there is still hope for peace with Pakistan. Though, Modi railed against Pakistan, taking India to the brink of a war right before election, now that he has won the second term, his increased majority could ironically bring the prospect of peace talk with Pakistan closer than at any point after the 2008 Mumbai attack. A stronger, more electorally safe Modi, no longer needs the specter of conflict with an arch enemy to aggravate his voting base. What's more, the international acclaim he would receive for a successful resolution to the Kashmir dispute may serve to balance the damage from his party's erosion of rights for religious minorities at home. So, once again, instead of the foreign policy dictating the outcome of the election, the election itself might dictate what kind of policy India is going to ultimately form towards Pakistan and future security attacks from it.